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Abstract
We study local interaction within a population located on a connected graph. Subjects
engage in several bilateral interactions at each round in a generalized PrisonersDilemma
(PD). In each round of play one randomly selected player gets the possibility to update
the action he plays in this PD. All individuals use the update rule Win Cooperate, Lose
Defect, a multi-player variant of Tit-for-Tat. Theoretical results on the set of stable states
of the associated dynamics are provided for the cases with and without rare mutations.
Simulations provide insight into the probability distribution over these stable states. In
both cases a rather high probability is assigned to stable states with a moderate level of
cooperation, implying that dominated strategies are used. Furthermore, the probability of
reaching the stable state with Nash equilibrium play is small.
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1. Introduction
Cooperative behavior is often observed in situations in which there is repeated interaction
between individuals. This phenomenon is most interesting in a setting where the individuals
would be strictly better o¤ by non-cooperative behavior when the interaction would only take
place once, as is the case in e.g. the PrisonersDilemma. Many repeated game models have tried
to explain cooperative behavior in such a setting. These models often take (hyper)rationality
of the agents in the game as their point of departure, i.e. they state that agents are able to
foresee or predict (most of) the consequences of current behavior on future payo¤s and that
they are able to calculate the optimal strategy, given their predictive powers.
Sometimes the driving force behind models explaining cooperative behavior is some kind
of revealed preference argument: If an individual cooperates with his opponent, although he
seemingly has nothing to gain from that, it must be the case that he has an unobservable
preference for cooperating over other actions. This is the same as saying that the model is
actually misspecied in the sense that the agents play a game which is di¤erent from the one
presented.
Recently, a di¤erent approach is taken by papers in the eld of evolutionary game theory, see
e.g. Eshel, Samuelson & Shaked (?), Schlag (?), Binmore & Samuelson (?, ?), the imaginary
discussion between representatives of di¤erent economic views in Selten (?) or the survey
article by van der Laan & Tieman (?). This paper provides such an alternative model. We
abandon the assumption that agents are rational utility-maximizers. Instead we propose that
the agents follow simple behavioral rules or heuristics in updating their action, as is seen often
in the eld of behavioral game theory (see e.g. Camerer (?)). Furthermore this paper is in the
line of local interaction models, see also e.g. Ellison (?, ?). The population consists of agents
located on a connected graph with undirected edges. Agents get to play the stage game only
with agents in a subgroup of the population, called their neighbors. The group of neighbors
consists of all agents located in positions on the graph directly adjacent to the location of the
agent. The group of neighbors is di¤erent for each agent, although there may be substantial
overlaps between the groups of neighbors of di¤erent agents.
In this paper we consider a model in which in each round of play, a randomly selected player
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plays the stage game with each of his neighbors. At each stage game a player plays one of k
possible actions, labelled from the non-cooperative action 1 to the cooperative action k: Based
upon the outcomes of the stage game the selected subject plays with his neighbors, he updates
the action he will play in the next stage game by comparing his average payo¤ of playing the
game with all his neighbors to the average payo¤ his neighbors got from playing the game with
him. Put in the terminology of a PrisonersDilemma (PD), the update rule can be presented
as follows. If the payo¤ for the agent is relatively high, he will act more cooperatively in the
next round of play. If the outcome is relatively low, he will tend to display less cooperative
behavior in the next round. This update rule is referred to as Win Cooperate, Lose Defect
1 is a standard one and that it does not imply that players who winare (in the long run)
better o¤ than players who lose. (WCLD). It is often encountered in experiments, both in
economics (see e.g. O¤erman, Sonnemans & Schram (?)) and in sociology (see e.g. Messick &
Liebrand (?)). This update rule is a multi-player variant of the well know Tit-for-Tat (TfT)
update rule.
An alternative rationale for this update rule can be found in the literature on aspiration
levels (see e.g. ?), Palomino & Vega-Redondo (?), Rabin (?), ?), ?), Thibaut & Kelley (?)
or Kelley & Thibaut (?)). An aspiration level is the minimum payo¤ an agent requires in
order to play a certain action. If his payo¤ falls short of his aspiration level, he will play a
certain other action. The update rule WCLD above is the result of setting the aspiration level
to be the average payo¤ of the neighbors an agent plays against. The aspiration level is thus
endogenous. Whenever the agent gets a higher payo¤ than the average of his neighbors, he will
tend to cooperation. When his payo¤ falls short of this number, he will play less cooperatively
in the next round of play.
In this paper we show that the WCLD dynamics admit precisely as many stable states as
there are actions in the stage game. In each stable state all players use the same action over
and over again. Furthermore, if we start the dynamics in a random initial state, with each
state having positive probability to be selected as initial state, each stable state has positive
1Note that the label Win Cooperate, Lose Defect is a standard one and that it does not imply that players
who winare (in the long run) better o¤ than players who lose.
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probability of being reached. Simulations are performed for three stage games of di¤erent size
(di¤erent numbers of actions), for two di¤erent payo¤ matrices and for two spatial structures.
We nd that the size does have an impact upon the simulation result: The more actions the
less probable it becomes to reach the stable states in which everybody plays the low and the
high labelled actions. The stable state with the lowest labelled action corresponds to the
unique (strict) Nash equilibrium and, therefore, increasing the number of actions means the
Nash equilibrium will be less probable to reach. Similar, the stable state with the highest
labelled action corresponds to the stable state with full cooperation. So, increasing the number
of actions makes full cooperation less probable also. However, an increase in the number
of actions makes the actions around the median (labelled action), which can be regarded as
representing moderate levels of cooperation, more probable. We run simulations with payo¤
matrices belonging to two di¤erent classes. The rst class of matrices represents the situation
in which the exact payo¤s are irrelevant and only the subjects own action and the average
action of his neighbors matter. For this class of stage games the probability distribution over
all stable states is symmetric around the median action(s). For the second class of payo¤
matrices considered, the payo¤s do matter. We show that this class of payo¤ matrices induces
a bias toward cooperative behavior. This bias is conrmed in the simulations where skewed
probability distributions over all stable states are observed. The spatial structure, being a
circle and a torus, has no signicant impact upon the simulation results.
In the literature on evolutionary game theory the notion of mutants has received much
attention. The robustness of the above results if rare mutations are introduced to the WCLD
dynamics is investigated. The mutation process we think of is one in which mutants are so rare
that the expected time in between two mutants is very much greater than the expected time the
WCLD dynamics need to reach one of the stable states. So, when a mutant occurs, typically the
standard WCLD dynamics bring the system to one of the stable states before another mutant
occurs. We show that under the presence of such rare mutations there exists a unique recurrent
set, being the set of all stable states of the process without mutations. So, it is impossible to
select one of the stable states as being the unique stochastically stable state, see e.g. ?) for a
denition. This result di¤ers qualitatively from other results in the literature, where only one
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stable state is stochastically stable, e.g. ?) or ?). We apply a recent result in ?) in order to
obtain some theoretical results and also to implement a meaningful simulation to compute the
probability distribution over the stable states in the recurrent set. These simulations will be
referred to as long-run, in contrast with the rst set of simulations mentioned above, to which
we will refer as medium-run. The long-run simulations yield similar distributions over stable
states as the medium-run simulations, although the interpretation of these results is di¤erent.
In the medium-run, the model converges to a stable state and stays there forever after. The
distribution over stable states thus only indicates the a priori probability of convergence to
each stable state. The long-run distribution can be interpreted as the long-run fraction of the
time the model will spend in each of the stable states, since occasional (indirect) transitions
from one stable state to another stable state take place.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and discusses some
preliminary properties of two classes of payo¤matrices used in the simulations. The theoretical
results for the WCLD dynamics, i.e. the medium-run in our terminology, and the corresponding
simulation results are presented in Section 3 respectively Section 4. Section 5 and Section 6
contain the theoretical respectively simulation results for the WCLD dynamics in case of rare
mutations, i.e. the long-run.
2. The basic model
We consider a population of N players. These players are located at the vertices of a connected
graph. Each player i; i = 1; : : : ; N has 2  m  N   1 distinct edges to m di¤erent other
players on the graph. We call these m players the neighbors of player i. We impose that the
edges of the graph are undirected, i.e. whenever i is a neighbor of j, then j is also a neighbor of
i. The class of such populations includes as special cases populations on circles and populations
on tori.2
2For some integer n  3, take N = n2. Then the population of these N players is said to be located on a
torus if for each player the location is given uniquely by a pair x = (x1; x2) with xl 2 f1; : : : ; ng ; l = 1; 2 and the
player on location x = (x1; x2) has the 8 players on the locations y = (y1; y2) with yl = (xl  1)modn; xl; (xl+
1)modn; l = 1; 2; except y = x as his neighbors.
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Each player only interacts directly with his neighbors. Since we want to focus on local
interaction we typically suppose that m  N; i.e. the group of neighbors is only a small
subset of the entire population. Interaction takes place during innitely many rounds, labelled
t = 0; 1; 2; : : :. In each round of play one of the players is selected randomly with each individual
being equally likely to be selected.3 The selected player at time t is called the subject at time
t: This subject at time t interacts with his m neighbors by playing the stage game with each of
his neighbors. This stage game is taken to be a symmetric 2-player kk bimatrix game (A;A0)
characterized by a payo¤ matrix A = (a;b)
k
a;b=1. So, playing action a against an opponent
playing b gives a payo¤ a;b to the subject and a payo¤ b;a to his opponent. The subject plays
the same action to each of his neighbors. The payo¤ matrix A is assumed to be a Prisoners
Dilemma matrix (PD-matrix).
Denition 2.1. For k  2; a k  k payo¤ matrix A such that
(i) a+1;a+1 > a;a; a = 1; : : : ; k   1,
(ii) 2a+1;a+1 > a;b + b;a; a = 1; : : : ; k   1; b = 1; : : : ; k;
(iii) for any pair (a; b) ; a; b = 1; : : : ; k   1; the triple (a+1;b;a;b;a;b+1) satises a+1;b <
a;b < a;b+1
is called a PD matrix.
So, for k = 2 the matrix A is a standard PrisonersDilemma and for k > 2 it has a Prisoners
Dilemma structure. In a PD matrix the action pair (1; 1) is the unique Nash equilibrium,
and the action pair (k; k) maximizes the sum of the payo¤s to both players and is the unique
symmetric Pareto e¢ cient outcome. Furthermore action a; a = 1; : : : ; k   1; dominates action
a+ 1. Two strict subclasses of the class of PD matrices are the class of PD BiLinear matrices
(PDBL-matrix) and the class of PD Quadratic-Linear matrices (PDQL-matrix).
3Although the process is in discrete time, a continuous time interpretation can easily be given by assigning
identical i.i.d. Poisson processes to every player in the population. Now, let every player be selected at the times
given by the Poisson process. Since the probability that two players are selected at the same point in time is 0,
this selection procedure yields the same results as the discrete time process.
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A PDBL matrix is a matrix A in which for given parameters  > 0 and  > 1 it holds that
a+1;a = a;a    and a;a+1 = a;a +   , resulting in a;b = 1;1     (a  1) +     (b  1),
i.e. the payo¤ to the subject is linear decreasing in his own action and linear increasing in
the action of his opponent. Well-known examples of PDBL matrices are so-called public goods
games, also called voluntary contribution mechanisms (VCM). In a VCM, players allocate
their endowment between a private and a public account. Then, the total amount in the public
account is multiplied by a factor (> 1) and subsequently the money in the account is divided
over all players. These games are often been studied in experimental economics, see e.g. ?) for
a specic experiment or ?) for a general survey on public goods games.
A k  k matrix A is a PDQL matrix when for given positive parameters 1; 2 ; 3 and 4
satisfying 1 > 2 + (k   1)3 and (k   1)3 > 4 it holds that
a;b = 11   1(a  1)2 + 2(a  1) + 3(a  1)(b  1)  4(b  1);
i.e. the payo¤ to the subject is quadratic-concave in his own action and is linear increasing in
the action of the opponent. The restrictions on the parameters i; i = 1; : : : ; 4; see to it that the
game is iteratively dominance solvable with a unique Nash equilibrium at (1; 1) : Note that both
the class of PDBL matrices and the class of PDQL matrices are strict subclasses of the class
of supermodular matrices as dened in Topkis (?), i.e. the playersactions in the stage game
are strategic complements. An example of a PDQL matrix is obtained when the stage game
between the subject and his opponent is a Cournot quantity competition duopoly. We also
provide an example featuring Bertrand price competition. This game does not satisfy the third
condition of Denition 2.1, but only a+1;a+1 < a;a+1; a = 1; : : : ; k   1; and a;b < a;b+1;
a = 1; : : : k; b = 1; : : : ; k 1: Nevertheless, this condition is su¢ cient for all the results obtained
in this paper. We call a matrix satisfying this payo¤ structure a generalized PDQL matrix.
Example 2.2. We consider a symmetric duopoly game in which two suppliers i and j in a
heterogeneous good market each choose an action out of a discrete set of prices. For given
parameters 0 > 0 and 1 > 2 > 0, let the demand function of player i = 1; 2 be given by
Di(pi; pj) = 0   1pi + 2pj , with pi the price of player i and pj , j = 1; 2; j 6= i, the price
of his opponent j. So, the demand for player is product is declining in is price, rising in js
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price and it is more sensitive to player is own price than it is to the price of his competitor.
Furthermore, suppose that for both players the cost function is given by C (q) = q with q the
production. Then, for given prices pi and pj the prot of player i is equal to
i(pi; pj) = Di(pi; pj)  pi   C(Di(pi; pj)) =  1 (pi)2 + (0 + 1) pi + 2pipj   2pj   0;
which is quadratic and concave in pi and linear in pj . Let pN be the price set by both players
in the (symmetric) Bertrand-Nash equilibrium price and let pC > pN be the cartel price which
is set by both players when maximizing their joint prots. Now, suppose that both players
agree to set the same price pi = pj = p. Then the prot of a player i is decreasing in his own
price pi for p above pN , but increasing in pi for p below pN . Hence an agreement below pN is
not reasonable. On the other hand, the prots of both players is decreasing in p when p > pC
and increasing in p when p < pC . So, also an agreement above pC is not reasonable. Therefore,
we restrict attention to prices in the interval

pN ; pC

. For suitable values of the parameters
we obtain a generalized PDQL payo¤ matrix when prices to be chosen by the players are
restricted to a discrete set of k prices within this interval, for instance when action a of player
i corresponds to setting its price equal to p = k ak 1p
N + a 1k 1p
C , so that action a = 1 yields the
Bertrand-Nash price pN and action a = k the cartel price pC . Observe that the grid becomes
ner when k increases. Indeed the payo¤ structure is linear increasing in the action of the
opponent and quadratic-concave in the own action of the player. This concludes the example.
We now consider the dynamics of the model. At each round of play, the action of each
player is given and determined by history. The state of the system at time t is described by
the N -tuple st =
 
st1; s
t
2; : : : ; s
t
N

where sti 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg denotes the action of player i at time
t. Initially (at t = 0) the population starts in a given state s0 2 S, where S = f1; 2; : : : ; kgN
is the state space. At each time t only the subject selected by the random mechanism gets
the possibility to update his action, a so called learning draw. Note that at each date only
one player gets the learning draw. The underlying assumption here is that at each moment in
(continuous, real world) time, with probability 0 this moment will be the moment of a potential
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change in behavior of more than one agent. The selected player rst plays the stage game with
his neighbors. Then, to update his action, the subject compares the average payo¤ he got from
playing the game once with each of his m neighbors, denoted by self , with the average payo¤
his m neighbors got from playing the game with the subject, denoted by nbs.4 For the ease
of discussion, in the following we say that a player is in a win (lose) situation, whenever
his own payo¤ is higher (lower) than the average payo¤ of his neighbors. Recall however from
footnote 1 that this does not mean that players who win are (in the long run) better o¤
than players who lose. Observe that the subject plays the same action against each of his
neighbors. The rationale behind this comparison is the assumption that players only interact
with a limited group of other individuals from the population and thus only observe the results
of these interactions. Based on the comparison of the payo¤s, the subject updates his action
using the update rule Win Cooperate, Lose Defect. Whenever self > nbs; the subject is in
a winsituation and sets his action sti to s
t
i + 1 if s
t
i < k and sticks to his current action s
t
i
if sti = k: When self < nbs; the subject is in a losesituation and updates his action s
t
i to
sti   1 if sti > 1 and to sti if sti = 1. When both payo¤s are exactly equal, the subject will stick
to the action he is playing at present in the next round. This update rule can be formalized
as follows. Let t be the k-dimensional vector of integers describing the neighborhood of the
subject at time t by dening tb 2 f0; : : : ;mg as the number of neighbors of the subject playing
action b, b = 1; : : : ; k, in state st. Let i be the subject selected at t. Then it holds that
self =
1
m
kX
b=1
tbsti;b and nbs =
1
m
kX
b=1
tbb;sti :
Hence it follows that
self ? nbs ,
 
A A0
sti
 t ? 0;
where (A A0)a is the a-th row of the matrix A A0. Therefore, according to WCLD the state
st+1 is given by
st+1i =
8>><>>:
sti + 1; when (A A0)sti  
t > 0 and sti < k;
sti   1; when (A A0)sti  
t < 0 and sti > 1;
sti; all other cases,
4We implicitly assume that di¤erent payo¤s can be added up. This is justied in e.g. the case that payo¤s
are in monetary terms and players are risk-neutral.
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for the subject i and by st+1j = s
t
j for all players j 6= i. The expression for st+1i makes explicit
that the update depends crucially on the group of players the subject interacts with.
The update rule WCLD is closely related to the well known Tit-for-Tat (TfT) update rule.
In fact, for k = 2 WCLD is exactly TfT in a two player PD game. In case of a multi-player
game several versions of TfT are known. Here we refer to the TfT-rule which says that in a
2-action PD game a player will play Cooperativein the next round if and only if an a priori
required fraction of his opponents plays Cooperative in the current round of play (see e.g.
?)). This multi-player version of TfT becomes more forgiving if the fraction required to switch
to the cooperative action is lowered. When this fraction is taken to be one, this TfT-rule is
quite severe in the sense that all opponents are required to play cooperatively to make a player
switching to cooperative behavior in the next round of play. For the case k = 2, in our model of
local interaction it holds that a subject playing cooperatively learns that some of his neighbors
defected on him when his average payo¤ is lower than that of his neighbors. According to
WCLD, he then will play non-cooperatively in the next round of play. A subject that plays the
non-cooperative action himself and gets a higher average payo¤ than his neighbors, reasons that
at least one neighbor is playing cooperatively and will then switch to cooperative behavior. So,
for a 2-action multi-player PD game the update rule WCLD is a version of TfT which depends
on the subjects own action. The rule administers severe punishment when the subject himself
plays cooperatively, because then one non-cooperatively playing neighbor is su¢ cient to switch
to non-cooperative behavior. On the other hand, the rule is forgiving in the sense that when
playing non-cooperatively himself, the subject will switch to cooperative behavior as soon as
one neighbor plays cooperatively. Thus WCLD is a highly reciprocal update rule.
For k > 2 the reasoning above still holds qualitatively in the sense that when the subject
observes that his own average payo¤ is higher (lower) than the average payo¤ of his neighbors,
he reasons that at least some of his neighbors are playing a more (less) cooperative action than
his own action and therefore he also updates his own action from sti to s
t
i + 1 (s
t
i   1), unless
already sti = k (s
t
i = 1). This can be made more precise for the subclass of PDBL matrices,
because in this case the payo¤ to the subject of the stage game is increasing linearly in the
action of his opponent. So, for A being a PDBL matrix we have that (A   A0)sti  t > 0
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(respectively < 0) and hence that the subject i is in a win(lose) situation, whenever his own
action is lower (higher) than the average action 1m
Pk
b=1 b
t
b of his neighbors. Thus, similar as
with TfT, the extent to which ones opponents act cooperatively determines whether one will
act cooperatively in the next round. However, in contrast with TfT, the update also depends
on the own action of the subject. When handed the learning draw, a player becomes more
forgiving in the next round if he plays more defectively in the current round.
Within the subclass of generalized PDQL matrices, the update rule is even more forgiving
than it is in the subclass of PDBL matrices in the sense that the above reasoning still holds
with respect to the winsituation, but is not necessarily true for the losesituation. So, in
case of generalized PDQL matrices the subject is certainly in a winsituation when his own
action is equal to or lower than the average action of his neighbors, and he may even be in a
winsituation when his own action is higher than the average action of his neighbors. This is
stated in the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3. Let A be a generalized PDQL matrix. If player i has the learning draw at
time t and sti  1m
Pk
b=1 b
t
b, then the subject i is in a winsituation.
Proof
First, we prove the statement for k = 3 and sti = 2. In this case it follows from s
t
i = 2 
1
m
Pk
b=1 b
t
b =
1
m
 
t1 + 2
t
2 + 3
t
3

that t3  t1. Furthermore, we have that
m(self   nbs) = (A A0)2  t = (2;1   1;2)t1 + (2;3   3;2)t3:
Because of the conditions of a generalized PDQL matrix, both 2;1 1;2 > 0 and 2;3 3;2 > 0.
So, the subject is in a winsituation if
t3 >
1;2   2;1
2;3   3;2
t
1:
Since t3  t1 it is su¢ cient to show that 1;2 2;12;3 3;2 < 1. Therefore, rewrite
1;2 2;1
2;3 3;2 =
(2;2 2;1)+(1;2 2;2)
(2;3 2;2)+(2;2 3;2) : Now, note that 2;2   2;1 = 2;3   2;2, since the payo¤ to the subject
in the stage game is linear in the action of the opponent. Furthermore, since the payo¤ is
quadratic-concave in ones own action, it holds that 1;2   2;2 < 2;2   3;2, leading to the
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conclusion that indeed 1;2 2;12;3 3;2 < 1: For general values of k and s
i
t, a similar argument on the
linear and quadratic nature of the payo¤ function yields the above result. 
In the above model we focus on a selected player playing the stage game with everyone
of his neighbors. The model can easily be extended to allow for a subject playing the stage
game with only a randomly chosen nonempty subset of his neighbors. Hence it also allows
for a setup where a player has a group of people he can interact with, but where the actual
interaction takes place only with a limited number of the members from this group. On top
of this model, in Section 5 we will introduce noise in the form of mutations. In the next two
sections we discuss the dynamic features of the model without mutations. This can be seen as
the medium-run behavior of the dynamic process.
3. Medium-run dynamic behavior
The main result of this section is stated in Theorem 3.2 and says that the only stable states of
the system are the states in which all players play the same action. An important observation
underlying this result is that the dynamics are boundary preserving, that is, an individual may
change his action only when one of his neighbors uses an action di¤erent from his own (see e.g.
Eshel, Sansone & Shaked (?)). To see this, all we need is the observation that if all neighbors
of a subject play the same action as the subject, all these players get exactly the same payo¤ in
all of the stage games that are played. Therefore the comparison of the subjects average payo¤
to the average payo¤ of his neighbors results in equality and the subject will not change his
action. So, only when at least one of the neighbors of the subject uses a di¤erent action than
the subject itself, it is possible that the average payo¤ of the subject di¤ers from the average
payo¤ of his neighbors. Such situations can only arise at the boundaries of clusters, where a
cluster is dened as a group of adjacent players that play the same action and a member of a
cluster is on the boundary of the cluster when at least one of his neighbors plays another action.
At a boundary a subject playing action a either does not change his action and the clusters
remain unchanged or he changes his action to a+1 or a 1, and consequently the subject joins
another cluster or forms a new cluster of size 1 by himself. When changing his action, the size
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of the cluster the subject belonged to decreases by one and the size of the cluster the subject
switches to increases by one. This argument, together with Lemma 3.1 below, implies that
when the subject is in an a-cluster (i.e. a cluster consisting of players all playing action a) and
has at least one of its neighbors in another cluster, either the subject stays in the a-cluster,
or joins one of the other neighboring clusters, or forms a new a0-cluster of size 1 with either
a0 = a + 1 or a0 = a   1. In the latter case we must have that at least one of the neighbors
belongs to an ea-cluster with ea > a0 when a0 = a+1, respectively ea < a0 when a0 = a 1. Thus,
in a population where all players use the same action, no new clusters will emerge. So, to show
convergence of the system to a stable state it is su¢ cient to show that there are sample paths
with positive probability that lead to a decrease of the number of clusters to 1. To prove the
main result, we rst state the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1. Let A be a k  k PD matrix. Then, for all a, a < k (respectively a > 1), every
a-player facing a set of opponents containing at least one ea-player, a < ea  k (1  ea < a) and
not containing any ba-player, 1  ba < a (a < ba  k), will change his action into a + 1 (a   1)
when this player gets the learning draw.
Proof
Suppose player i with sit = a, a < k; faces a set of opponents containing at least one ea-player,
a < ea  k, and not containing any ba-player, 1  ba < a, and gets the learning draw. Then it
holds that tb = 0 for b < a and 
t
b > 0 for at least one of the components b = a + 1; : : : ; k.
Hence
self   nbs = 1
m
 
A A0
a
t =
1
m
kX
b=a
tb (a;b   b;a) > 0;
since iterated application of the inequality a+1;b < a;b < a;b+1 gives us k;a < : : : < a+2;a <
a+1;a < a;a < a;a+1 < a;a+2 < : : : < a;k. Hence, according to WCLD player i updates
his action to st+1i = a+ 1. An analogous reasoning shows that the subject updates his action
to a  1 when he faces a set of opponents containing at least one ea-player, 1  ea < a, and not
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containing any ba-player, a < ba  k. 
For a = 1; : : : ; k, let s(a) 2 S denote the state in which all players use action a, i.e. si(a) = a
for all i = 1; : : : ; N . We now prove the following theorem, which says that a state is stable if
and only if all players use the same action.
Theorem 3.2. For k  2, let the k  k matrix A be a PD matrix. Then the set of stable
states is given by fs(a) 2 Sj a = 1; : : : ; kg. Furthermore, from any initial state s0, all stable
states s (a) with mini s0i  a  maxi s0i can be reached with positive probability.
Proof
First, from the boundary preservingness, it is trivial that any state s (a) ; a = 1; 2; : : : ; k; is
stable. Second, in any other state at least one player will be in the position indicated in Lemma
3.1 and consequently he will update when handed the learning draw. Therefore, no states but
those in the set fs(a) 2 Sj a = 1; : : : ; kg are stable.
Now consider the following sequence of learning draws to reach the stable state s (a) for
some a = 1; : : : ; k. First give the learning draw to a player on the boundary of a 1-cluster.
According to Lemma 3.1 this player will update his action to 2. Continue to do so until no
1-players are left. Then, give the learning draw sequentially to all 2-players. In absence of any
1-players, 2-players will update their action to action 3. When all 2-players have done so, give
the learning draw to all 3-players, and so forth, until there are no players left using an action
b < a: Then give the learning draw sequentially to all k-players on the boundary of a k-cluster.
They will update to action k   1 according to Lemma 3.1. When there are no k-players left,
start giving the learning draw to (k  1)-players on the boundary, and so forth, until there are
no players left who use an action b > a. Then the stable state is reached in which all players
use action a: This particular sequence of learning draws occurs with positive probability. Thus
we have shown that each stable state in which all players use action a can be reached from any
initial state containing at least one ea  a player and at least one ba  a player. 
From Theorem 3.2 it follows directly that when all actions are present in the initial state s0;
all stable states can be reached with positive probability. Note that there are many more paths
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than the one described in the proof that lead to stable states. Therefore it is not necessarily
the case that the occurrence of a stable state becomes increasingly rare when the number of
actions k increases. In section 4 we show that convergence times do increase with k; but not
dramatically. Furthermore, from Lemma 3.1 it immediately follows that no stable state can
be asymptotically stable, because one or more mutations can take the population out of a
stable state and lead it to another stable state with positive probability. We postpone WCLD
dynamics with rare mutations until Section 5.
The next two corollaries follow immediately from the proof of Theorem 3.2. For given state
s 2 S, let s0 be dened by s0i = k + 1  si for all i = 1; : : : ; N , i.e. the states s and s0 are each
others mirror image in the sense that player i plays action k + 1  a in s0 if he plays action a
in s. Note that for any pair of stable states s(a) and s(k + 1   a), a = 1; : : : ; k, it holds that
they are each others mirror image. Now, a probability distribution over all states is said to be
symmetric if for every s 2 S it assigns the same probability to s and to its mirror image s0.
In the proof of the following Corollary 3.3, let p1s;s be the probability that the system
converges in the limit to state s, given that the initial state is s. From Theorem 3.2 it is
immediately clear that p1s;s can only be positive i¤ s is an element of the set of stable states,
i.e. s = s(a) for some a = 1; : : : ; k.
Corollary 3.3. At time t = 0, let the initial state be drawn from a symmetric probability
distribution over all states. Then, for k = 2 the a priori (i.e. before initialization of the state
at t = 0) probability of convergence to each one of the two stable states is exactly 12 for any
2 2 PD matrix A.
Proof
Note that s(2) = s0(1). The proof of Theorem 3.2 shows that there is positive probability to
end up in either one of these two stable states from all other states. Lemma 3.1 shows that
a 1-player, facing a set of opponents containing at least one 2-player, will change his action
and become a 2-player and that a 2-player, facing a set of opponents containing at least one
1-player, will become a 1 -player. Hence p1s;s(1) = p
1
s0;s(2) for any initial state s. Since the initial
state is drawn from a symmetric probability distribution, both stable states are reached with
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equal probability. 
A symmetry argument analogous to the one used in the proof above yields the following
corollary. Note that Corollary 3.3 holds for all PD matrices, while the next corollary only holds
for PDBL matrices.
Corollary 3.4. At time t = 0, let the initial state be drawn from a symmetric probability
distribution over all states and let A be a PDBL matrix. Then, for any k  2, the a priori
probability distribution of convergence of the process to each one of the k stable states is
symmetric around k+12 .
Proof
Since A is a PDBL matrix, we know from Section 2 that a subject is in a win(lose) situation
if his action is lower (higher) than the average action of his neighbors. Hence it follows that
p1s;s(a) = p
1
s0;s(k+1 a), a = 1; 2; : : : ; k for any initial state s. Since the initial state is drawn from
a symmetric probability distribution, the a priori probability of reaching state s(a) is equal to
that of reaching state s(k + 1  a) for all a = 1; : : : ; k. 
4. Medium-Run Simulations
In Corollary 3.3 we have seen that for k = 2 the frequency distribution of reaching either one
of the two stable states will be exactly 12 ; when the initial state is selected according to a
symmetric probability distribution. Furthermore, for k  2; we see in Corollary 3.4 that the
frequency distribution will be symmetric around k+12 when the payo¤s are bilinear. To gain
more insight in the actual shape of the frequency distribution for k > 2; simulations have to be
performed in order to study the behavior of the process. To do so, we consider populations in
which the spatial structure is taken to be either a circle or a torus, i.e. in the graph reecting
this spatial structure each player has two or eight neighbors respectively. Because of computing
power restrictions in the case of a torus, we restrict simulations to N = 16, i.e. to 16 players
located on the circle or to a 4 4 torus. We perform simulation runs for di¤erent values of k.
Furthermore, all of simulation runs are performed for two di¤erent payo¤matrices A: The rst
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matrix A we study is a PDBL matrix. The second matrix A is a generalized PDQL matrix
generated by Bertrand price competition on a discrete set of prices with the Bertrand-Nash
price pN as the lowest price and the cartel price pC as the highest price, see Example 2.2.
To restrict the number of simulations, we only perform simulations to estimate the prob-
ability that a population ends up in a certain stable state, given that the initial state is drawn
from the (symmetric) uniform distribution over all states, i.e. each state has equal probability
of being selected as the initial state. To get the a priori probability (before initialization at time
t = 0) of reaching each stable state, we record how often each of the stable states is reached
for a large number of initializations. This gives us an estimate of the frequency distribution of
convergence to the stable states.
Each simulation consists of the following steps. To initialize the simulation an initial state
s0 is drawn from the uniform distribution by assigning to each player i a random action s0i
with Pr
 
s0i = a

= 1k , for all a = 1; 2; : : : ; k. Then, at each time t  0, a player is chosen at
random (uniformly) from the population and gets the learning draw. Since the dynamics are
boundary preserving, choosing a player that is not on a boundary of a cluster does not result
in a change of the state.5 The selected player plays the k k stage game (A;A0) against all his
neighbors and updates his action through the update rule WCLD. We proceed until the system
has converged, i.e. until all players play the same action, and record the obtained stable state.
We run 1; 000 of these simulations and call these 1; 000 simulations a simulation run. After a
simulation run, we report the frequency distribution over stable states as the outcome. The
law of large numbers implies that this frequency distribution converges to the true probability
distribution over stable states when the number of simulations in each simulation run is taken
to innity.
The medium-run simulation results are reported in tables A.1 to A.3 in appendix A. We
draw attention to several interesting features of the results. The rst of these features is that
in all of the medium-run simulations there is a high probability that the system ends up in a
state with a moderate level of cooperation. When the payo¤ matrix is PDBL, the stable state
in which all players use the median action k+12 (the median stable state) is reached most often,
5Therefore convergence time would decrease dramatically when we would only select agents on the boundary.
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and a lot of mass in the frequency distribution is piled up at the stable states corresponding
to the actions k 12 , respectively
k+3
2 , at either side of this median stable state. The intuition
for this result is twofold. First, in a state where many di¤erent actions are being played, it is
more likely for an extremeaction to disappear than it is for an action closer to the median
action. Under WCLD dynamics, a single learning draw handed to a player using action 1 (k)
on a boundary is enough to make this player update to action 2 (k  1), an action closer to the
median action. However, a player on a boundary using an action close to the median action
is approximately as likely to update to a higher labelled action as he is to update to a lower
labelled action. Thus, the probability that a player on a boundary that uses an action close to
the median action will remain using an action close to the median action over time, is much
higher than the probability of a player on a boundary using an extreme action staying close to
this action over time. Second, once there are no players left using action 1 (k), this action can
not reappear, in contrast to other actions a 2 f2; 3; : : : ; k   1g, which can reappear as long as
there is at least one player left who uses an action b < a and one player who uses an action
c > a. These two arguments imply that there are many more paths to stable states in which
all players use an action close to the median action (i.e. a stable state close tothe median
stable state) than there are paths to stable states in which all players use an action close to
one of the extreme actions 1 or k.
When the number of actions in the stage game k increases, there are three clear e¤ects
in the simulation outcomes. First, we observe symmetry around the median action in the
frequency distribution for PDBL matrices. Here the explanation is provided by Corollary 3.4.
Second, the distribution is spread out over more actions, and as a consequence the frequency of
convergence to each individual action decreases. Third, the frequency distribution is not spread
out to an extend that, for large values of k; the model converges to each stable state at least
once in the simulations. The frequency of the extremeactions, i.e. the actions close to actions
1 and k; decreases rapidly when k increases. From Theorem 3.2 we know that all stable states
have positive probability of being reached. Apparently, the probability of reaching a stable
state in which all players use an action close to one of the extreme actions 1 or k is positive
but very small. To quantify the two last mentioned e¤ects, we calculate the variance of the
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frequency distribution that results from the simulations 6. Note that the second e¤ect increases
the variance, while the third e¤ect decreases the variance of the distribution. We see that the
variance decreases when k increases. This clearly means that the tendency that extreme
actions have lower frequencies dominates the e¤ect of spreading out of the distribution when k
increases. From this we conclude that as k increases, the total frequency of the actions around
the median action increases, making moderate levels of cooperative behavior more probable.
Another interesting feature we focus on in the simulation results is the skewness of the
frequency distribution towards the higher labelled action when the payo¤matrix is generalized
PDQL. As we have shown in Corollary 2.3, a subject is in a winsituation more easily when the
payo¤s are quadratic-linear than when the payo¤s are bilinear. A subject in a winsituation
updates to a higher labelled action. Therefore, it is evident that the generalized PDQL matrix
imposes a bias toward higher labelled actions compared to the outcome for a PDBL matrix.
However, the magnitude of this e¤ect is not a priori clear. The simulation results reveal a
moderate skewness for the parameter values we simulated with. Since these parameter values
yield realistic values of the price and cross-price elasticities in the underlying Bertrand price
competition game, our simulation results can be interpreted as support for ndings that in real
world settings people tend to moderate levels of cooperation. More specically, our ndings
support the claim that although people will not take the fully cooperative action, they will use
an action that is between the median action and the fully cooperative action most of the time.
The spatial structure on which the players are located does not have much of an e¤ect on
these results. We see that in most simulation outcomes the frequency of convergence to the
median stable state is slightly less when the players are located on a torus than when they are
located on a circle. However, this di¤erence is not pronounced enough to regard it as anything
but an artefact of the simulations.
The last point we focus on in the simulation outcomes are the convergence times. In general
we see that outcomes with a lower frequency tend to display higher convergence time. A stable
state that takes many periods for the system to reach is not reached often, since in the (many)
periods during which the system has not yet converged, there is always a probability that the
6The values of the variances can be found in the tables in appendix A.
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system moves away from the stable state that is hard to reach, and move towards another
stable state. We also see that the convergence times slightly increase with k. This means that
although for larger k there are more stable states the system can converge to and there is a
large probability that there are more di¤erent actions present in the initial state s0; this does
not have a substantial inuence on the speed of convergence. Furthermore, there is not much
di¤erence in convergence times between the simulations performed with PDBL and PDQL
payo¤s. However, we note a large increase in convergence time when the spatial structure is a
torus instead of a circle. This e¤ect can be illustrated by looking at (for the case k = 2) the
number of neighbors the last player playing action a; a = 1; 2; has in a population where all
other players use action b; b = 1; 2; b 6= a: This a-player has 2 neighbors playing an action b
when located on a circle and 8 neighbors playing action b on a torus. Whenever the a-player
gets the learning draw, he will switch his action and from then on the population will be in
stable state s (b). However, when one of his neighbors gets the learning draw, this player will
switch to a and the state moves further away from the stable state s (b). Clearly on the circle
the probability that a neighbor of the a-player gets the learning draw is 2 times as large as the
probability that the a-player gets the learning draw, but 8 times as large when the population
is located at the torus. Thus, when only one a-player is left, the probability of moving away
from the stable state s(b) is larger than that of reaching the stable state, but these probabilities
become more unfavorable for reaching the stable state when the number of neighbors of each
player increases. This e¤ect accounts for the rapidly increasing convergence time when the
number of neighbors m increases. In fact, the increase in convergence time is exponential when
we increase the dimension of the neighborhood, as is done in the transition from a circle to a
torus. From the simulation outcomes, we see that the e¤ect is stronger than one would predict
solely on the basis of this illustration. This is due to the fact that the number of neighbors
also inuences the probability of getting one step closer to a stable state, when the state is not
very close to a stable state yet.
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5. Long-Run dynamic behavior.
In this section we study the long-run e¤ects of adding rare mutations to the system. We
introduce mutations in the original Markov process and we characterize the unique recurrent
set of this process with mutations, which turns out to be the set of all stable states of the
WCLD dynamics without mutations. Since this set is not a singleton, the question arises what
the distribution of the long-run fraction of time spent in each of the di¤erent states in the
recurrent set looks like. Note that the long-run fraction of time spent in a state is equal to the
probability to be in this state at an arbitrary time t, far enough away from the time origin 0.
Our analysis is closely related to the standard literature on stochastic stability, e.g. ?), Young
(?), (?) and ?).
Following ?), we introduce an articial Markov process representing mutations on the set of
stable states and show that this process has a unique invariant distribution. This distribution
only puts positive weight on the elements of the unique recurrent set, which we characterize.
We apply a result from ?) to prove that this invariant distribution is equal to the limit of the
invariant distribution of the original Markov process with a very small probability of mutation,
when this probability of mutation is taken to zero in the limit. Subsequently we show that the
long-run simulation output converges to this unique invariant distribution.
We think of mutations as being rare, i.e. the probability of a mutation is small and vanishes
in the limit. This means that the expected time that passes between the occurrence of two
mutations becomes very large. Since the expected time for the standard WCLD dynamics to
converge is not a¤ected, this simply means that in the limit the expected time between two
mutations exceeds the convergence time of the WCLD dynamics by a large factor. In other
words, the expected time in between mutations is much larger than the expected time the
WCLD dynamics need to reach one of the stable states. Thus we can simply neglect rare
mutations that occur during the period of time when the model is not in a stable state. This
means that we can su¢ ce with perturbing the stable states of the dynamics. Nevertheless,
some of our theoretical arguments are valid in a more general framework, which allows for
several mutants at the same time also.
Since each player has k actions, the number of states in the system is equal to K = kN :We
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enumerate the states s 2 S by j = 1; 2; : : : ;K and we associate j = 1; 2; : : : ; k with the k stable
states s(j) of the medium-run dynamics. Also for j > k the j-th state is denoted by s(j).
We now introduce the transition matrices P = (pjh)
K
j;h=1 ; representing the Markov process
specied by the original WCLD dynamics and Q = (qjh)
K
j;h=1 representing mutations from
stable states only. Specically, we focus attention on one-shot mutations from stable states. A
one-shot mutation from a stable state s (j) ; j = 1; 2; : : : ; k; yields a state in which one player
plays a randomly chosen action a 2 f1; 2; : : : ; kg ; a 6= j; and all other players in the population
still play action j: We call a state that can be reached from a stable state by a single one-shot
mutation adjacent to this stable state. The reason for the focus on one-shot mutations is that
(a sequence of) one-shot mutations is enough to get the system from any stable state to any
other stable state with positive probability, as indicated in Lemma 5.1. As indicated above, we
focus on a probability of mutation that is small compared to the speed of convergence of the
dynamics P; i.e. mutations that only play a role once the dynamics P have settled down. We
incorporate this feature through explicitly only perturbing stable states. Thus, for all j > k we
set qjj = 1 and hence qjh = 0 for all h 6= j. Moreover, we assume that, among other mutations,
Q contains one-shot mutations from stable states, i.e. for any stable state j; 1 < j  k, that
qjh > 0 for at least one adjacent state s(h) with, for exactly one player i; si (h) < j and for any
stable state j; 1  j < k, that qjh0 > 0 for at least one adjacent state s(h0) with, for exactly
one player i; si (h0) > j. So, mutations from a stable state s(j) may lead to actions either
below or above j. Now, let P (") = (1  ")P + "Q be the Markov process obtained from the
medium-run Markov process P by adding a probability " > 0 of a mutation taking the system
from state j to state h with positive probability i¤ qjh > 0. Thus P (") is an ergodic Markov
process of the type commonly used in the literature, e.g. ?) and Young (?, ?). The assumption
stated above on the entries of Q guarantees that with positive probability the system can go
from any stable state to any other stable state, i.e. all of the stable states s(j), j = 1; : : : ; k;
are in the same recurrent set, as dened in ?) (p. 220). The next lemma says that the set of
stable states is the unique recurrent set of the process P (").
Lemma 5.1. The set fs(j) 2 Sjj = 1; : : : ; kg of stable states is the unique recurrent set of the
system P (").
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Proof.
By the assumptions on Q, for any stable state s(a), a > 1 (a < k) a one-shot mutation to a
state in which one mutant plays an action b < a (b > a) can occur. Then, following the proof
of Theorem 3.2 with positive probability there is a path that converges to any stable state s(c)
with b  c  a (a  c  b). Thus every stable state is connected with every other stable state
through a series of one-shot mutations. Therefore, all the k stable states s(j), j = 1; : : : ; k; are
in the same recurrent set. Since the process P has no other stable states, this is the unique
recurrent set. 
Since P (") is ergodic, it has a unique invariant distribution over the set of states. For
given " > 0, let  (";Q) 2 IRK denote the invariant distribution of the Markov process P (")
over the set of states S, with j (";Q) 2 IR the average long-run time that the system is in
state j 2 S. From Lemma 5.1 it follows that j (";Q) goes to zero for all j > k when " goes
to zero. So, in the limit the invariant distribution only assigns positive measure to the stable
states in the recurrent set. To nd this limiting invariant distribution we consider the articial
Markov process Q  (P )1 = QP1. The specication of the entries of matrix Q guarantees that
QP1 implicitly denes an ergodic k  k Markov process on the stable states and therefore
it implicitly denes a unique invariant distribution on the set of stable states of P . This
distribution contains the rst k entries of the unique eigenvector  (Q) 2 IRK of the matrix
(QP1)0 with eigenvalue one, i.e. (QP1)0  (Q) =  (Q). Note that the transpose of  (Q) ;
i.e.  (Q)0 ; is the invariant distribution of QP1. The following lemma states that in the
invariant distribution  (Q)0 only the stable states of the process P have positive measure.
Lemma 5.2. The unique invariant distribution  (Q)0 of the Markov process QP1 satises
j (Q) = 0 for all j > k and 

j (Q) > 0 for all j  k:
Proof.
Since the process P converges to one of the stable states, we have that only the rst k columns
of the matrix P1 can contain positive entries. All other columns of P1 only contain zeroes and
so do the corresponding columns of QP1. So, the components j > k of the unique eigenvector
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with eigenvalue 1 of (QP1)0 are necessarily 0, since the associated rows of (QP1)0 contain
zeroes only.
The components of the invariant distribution have to sum to 1: Thus, one of the components
j (Q) ; j  k has to be positive. Since all (stable) states j; j  k; are in the same recurrent
set, they either all have zero measure or they all have positive measure. Thus, we conclude
that j (Q) > 0 for all j  k: 
We now proceed with the claim that the invariant distribution  (Q)0 is the limit of a
sequence  (";Q)0 as " # 0, a result due to ?).
Theorem 5.3. Let  (";Q)0 be the invariant distribution of the ergodic Markov matrix P (")
as specied above, then lim"#0  (";Q)0 =  (Q)0.
Proof.
Follows directly from ?), Proposition 2, 3 and 4 and Theorem 2. 
We now describe the setup of the long-run simulations. For each stable state s(a), a =
1; : : : ; k; we take each state s(j) with qaj > 0 as the (xed) initial state of a simulation run. As
before, a simulation run consists of T simulations. At each simulation of the simulation run,
the process P is run until the system has converged to a stable state. The simulation run over
T simulations provide us with estimates bpTjb for the transition probabilities p1jb in P1 from state
s(j) to each of the stable state s(b), b = 1; : : : ; k. Note that since the system always ends up in
a stable state, bpTji = 0 for all i > k. Weighting the estimates bpTjb with qaj and adding up over
j results in estimates brTab = Pj qaj  bpTjb of transition probabilities from stable state s(a) to
stable state s(b) of the Markov process QP1. Calculating the unique eigenvector at eigenvalue
1 (with components summing to 1) of the k  k matrix of estimates bR0 = (brTab)ka;b=10 results
in estimates of the rst k entries of the distribution  (Q) ; which are denoted by Tj (Q) ;
j = 1; 2; : : : ; k; to indicate that the system bR0 is generated by the simulation runs of length T .
As noted before, the remaining entries of T (Q) are 0: A law of large numbers guarantees that
T (Q) converges to  (Q) as T goes to innity.
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It should be noted that although the technique developed above holds for quite general
specications of the matrix of mutations Q; the distribution  (Q) depends on this specica-
tion. In the long-run simulations we focus on a matrix Q = QLR that only contains one-shot
mutations from the stable states.
The actual simulation runs are done in order to estimate the transition probabilities bp1jb
mentioned above. Each simulation consists of the following steps. First we initialize the
simulation with a state j adjacent to a stable state. Then we perform the simulation in the
same way as described above in section 4. A player is chosen at random (uniformly) from
the population and gets the learning draw. The selected agent plays the k  k bimatrix stage
game (A;A0) against all his neighbors, looks at the outcomes and updates his action through
the update rule WCLD. Then time progresses one period and a second player is selected at
random to get the learning draw, etc. until the system has converged, i.e. until all players play
the same action. We record the stable state to which the system has converged and start the
next simulation, which is initialized with the same state as the rst simulation. We perform
simulation runs of length T = 1; 000. After we have run an entire simulation run, we use the
frequency distribution over stable states bp1000jh ; h = 1; 2; : : : ; k; as estimates for the transition
probabilities p1jh. For each stable state, we perform a simulation run for all states j that are
adjacent to this stable state. For each stable state i, we include the outcome of a simulation
run in which each simulation is initialized with the stable state itself. This run has already
converged at the start-up phase and therefore we know that the transition probability p1ii will
be 1 for sure, and we neednt actually perform the simulation run. With the estimates of the
transition probabilities obtained from simulating, we calculate the invariant distribution of the
matrix R; which is an estimate of the distribution  (Q).
As before, the simulations are performed for di¤erent values of k and for both the spatial
structure of a circle and a torus. Furthermore, all of the simulations are performed for a
PDBL matrix and for a generalized PDQL matrix generated by Bertrand price competition as
described in example 2.2.
At this point we note that the medium-run simulations can be placed in the same framework
as the long-run simulations. This requires specifying the medium-run matrix QMR as qjh = 1K ,
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for j = 1; 2; : : : ; k; h = 1; 2; : : :K; and qjj = 1; j > k, i.e. each of the rst k rows of QMR
contains the uniform distribution over all initial states and the other rows of QMR only contain
a 1 on the diagonal and zeroes elsewhere. Since QMR 6= QLR, also  (QMR) 6=  (QLR) and
T (QMR) 6= T (QLR). Nevertheless, Lemma 5.2 and Theorem 5.3 both apply to  (QMR)
and, moreover, we are able to characterize  (QMR) explicitly.
Corollary 5.4. The unique invariant distribution  (QMR)0 of the Markov process QMRP1
is given by  (QMR)0 =
 
1
K ;
1
K ; : : : ;
1
K
  P1.
Proof.
The claim follows from straightforward matrix algebra.

1
K
;
1
K
; : : : ;
1
K

 P1 QMRP1 =
 
KX
i=1
1
K
(P1)ij
!K
j=1
QMRP1
=
0@ KX
j=1
(
KX
i=1
1
K
(P1)ij 
KX
i=1
1
K
(P1)ih
)1AK
h=1
=
0@ KX
i=1
1
K
(P1)ih 
KX
j=1
(
KX
i=1
1
K
(P1)ij
)1AK
h=1
:
Since the vector
PK
i=1
1
K (P
1)ij
K
j=1
is a probability distribution,
PK
j=1
nPK
i=1
1
K (P
1)ij
o
=
1; which yields  
KX
i=1
1
K
(P1)ih
!K
h=1
=

1
K
;
1
K
; : : : ;
1
K

 P1:
This concludes the proof. 
Note that this implies that j (QMR) = 0; for j > k; since all columns j; j > k; of the
matrix P1 only contain zeroes.
6. Results of Long-Run Simulations
The long-run simulation results are reported in tables A.4 to A.6 in appendix A. In this
section we discuss these results. Note that the tables containing the results of the long-run
simulations do not contain convergence times. The reason for this lies in the procedure for the
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long-run simulations as described above. The individual simulation runs performed to estimate
bp1000jh ; h = 1; 2; : : : ; k; converge as fast as their medium-run counterparts. However, calculating
the invariant distribution from these estimates bp1000jh makes it impossible to give a meaningful
statistic for convergence time associated with the entries of the invariant distribution.
We see from the tables that the frequency distributions resulting from the long-run sim-
ulations look much the same as those associated with the medium-run outcomes. Indeed, in
section 5 we already showed that all of the stable states of the model without mutations are
stochastically stable states in the model with mutations. Now we see that the frequency dis-
tribution over the states in the set of stochastically stable states is also very similar to the
medium-run outcome. However, note that the interpretation of the long-run distribution is
di¤erent from that of the medium-run distribution. The entries of the long-run distribution
represent both the probability of being in each one of the stable state at a given time and
the long-run fraction of the time that the system spends in each one of the stable states. The
medium-run distribution only gives probabilities of convergence to each stable state. After
this initial convergence, in the absence of mutations, the system remains in the stable state it
converged to forever.
Most features of the long-run results and the intuition behind these features are similar to
the ones discussed in section 4. We only briey mention these outcomes here. First, in the
long-run, the model will sustain moderate levels of cooperation. Second, the inuence of the
number of action k is limited. When k is larger, the frequency distribution is more spread out
over the larger number of stable states and the variance of the distribution decreases, leading
to a higher probability of being in a moderately cooperative stable state at a given time. Third,
the inuence of the spatial structure on which the population is located seems negligible, as
long as the graph is connected. Fourth, we have the symmetry around the median action for
PDBL payo¤s and fth, we see that the frequency distribution over stable states is skewed
towards the higher labelled actions when we focus on PDQL payo¤s.
Note that these long-run outcomes have been obtained by focussing on the crucial inuence
of rare mutations, as is done in most of the standard literature on stochastic evolutionary
models. Therefore, our results are quite general. In our opinion these general results suggests
27
that the standard literature should focus less on the selection of one (equilibrium) state when
players are rational, and devote more attention to the e¤ect of introducing boundedly rational
update rules in the selection models. Our results show that this is a fruitful exercise with
sometimes surprising results.
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A. Simulation Results.
Here we report the results of some of our simulation runs. We present separate tables for
di¤erent values of k, k = 3; 7; 11. For each k we ran four di¤erent simulations for two spatial
structure, being a circle of size N = 16 and a 44 torus, and two payo¤matrices, being PDBL
and generalized PDQL. The parameters for each PDBL matrix are a;b = 500  10  (a  1) +
20  (b  1) : Note that the values of the parameters 1;1 = 500;  = 10 and  = 2 are irrelevant
because the dynamics are solely driven by the subjects action and his neighbors average action.
The generalized PDQL matrix corresponds to Bertrand price competition with 0 = 20; 1 = 1
and 2 =
1
2 . The rst column contains the labels of the actions. The heading of each of the
other columns captures the relevant information, e.g. PDBL circlemeans a PDBL payo¤
matrix and a circle as spatial structure. Each column shows the frequency distribution over
the actions. For the medium-run simulation, the convergence times are included in brackets.
Convergence time is the time (number of rounds in the model) it takes the system to reach a
stable state when we hand out the learning draw uniformly over all players. Thus, we do not
restrict the dynamics to select only players that are on a boundary of a cluster, which would
decrease convergence time considerably.
At the bottom of each column, the variance of the frequency distribution in this column is
shown. To make the variances in the di¤erent tables comparable, we rescale the labels of the
actions in the variance calculations. An action with label j; j = 1; 2; : : : ; k; gets a value of j 1k 1 ;
so that for all di¤erent values of k, the actions are on [0; 1] : The reported variance is thus
kX
j=1
Pr (X = j)
(
j   1
k   1  
kX
i=1

Pr (X = i)  i  1
k   1
)2
;
where Pr (X = j) is taken to be the reported frequency of reaching stable state j.
Tables A.1 through A.3 present the results of the medium-run simulations, while tables A.4
through A.6 report the results for the long-run simulations.
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action PDBL Circle PDQL Circle PDBL Torus PDQL Torus
1 :156 (378) :109 (400) :242 (13; 168) :091 (12; 536)
2 :677 (280) :625 (292) :503 (14; 783) :508 (12; 367)
3 :167 (403) :266 (379) :255 (13; 354) :401 (14; 375)
var :081 :088 :124 :099
Table A.1: Medium-run simulation results for k = 3.
action PDBL Circle PDQL Circle PDBL Torus PDQL Torus
1 :000 ( ) :000 ( ) :000 ( ) :000 ( )
2 :026 (464) :008 (411) :025 (19; 551) :010 (17; 467)
3 :247 (481) :120 (419) :247 (13; 826) :163 (14; 682)
4 :467 (400) :394 (416) :452 (14; 197) :445 (13; 844)
5 :232 (407) :366 (450) :251 (15; 528) :329 (13; 715)
6 :028 (457) :104 (518) :025 (18; 329) :053 (16; 130)
7 :000 ( ) :008 (754) :000 ( ) :000 ( )
var :019 :022 :019 :019
Table A.2: Medium-run simulation results for k = 7.
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action PDBL Circle PDQL Circle PDBL Torus PDQL Torus
1 :000 ( ) :000 ( ) :000 ( ) :000 ( )
2 :000 ( ) :000 ( ) :000 ( ) :000 ( )
3 :006 (875) :001 (756) :005 (9; 022) :000 ( )
4 :055 (559) :016 (463) :055 (9; 581) :035 (10; 959)
5 :241 (491) :107 (514) :268 (15; 470) :159 (13; 865)
6 :362 (472) :274 (488) :371 (14; 453) :367 (13; 535)
7 :244 (478) :366 (486) :246 (13; 620) :319 (14; 689)
8 :087 (468) :181 (533) :051 (15; 472) :111 (13; 402)
9 :005 (512) :045 (596) :004 (16; 827) :009 (9; 697)
10 :000 ( ) :009 (587) :000 ( ) :000 ( )
11 :000 ( ) :001 (1263) :000 ( ) :000 ( )
var :011 :013 :010 :010
Table A.3: Medium-run simulation results for k = 11.
action PDBL Circle PDQL Circle PDBL Torus PDQL Torus
1 :194 :174 :237 :0999
2 :596 :595 :512 :505
3 :211 :231 :250 :395
var :101 :100 :122 :102
Table A.4: Long-run simulation results for k = 3.
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action PDBL Circle PDQL Circle PDBL Torus PDQL Torus
1 2:95 10 3 9:21 10 4 4:16 10 5 0
2 5:10 10 2 2:27 10 2 1:89 10 2 6:38 10 3
3 2:39 10 1 1:37 10 1 2:49 10 1 1:62 10 1
4 4:06 10 1 3:39 10 1 4:64 10 1 4:38 10 1
5 2:43 10 1 3:49 10 1 2:48 10 1 3:46 10 1
6 5:58 10 2 1:35 10 1 1:92 10 2 4:72 10 2
7 2:69 10 3 1:64 10 2 8:63 10 5 4:72 10 4
var 2:67 10 2 2:89 10 2 1:81 10 2 1:82 10 2
Table A.5: Long-run simulation results for k = 7.
action PDBL Circle PDQL Circle PDBL Torus PDQL Torus
1 4:43 10 5 3:64 10 6 0 0
2 1:76 10 3 2:08 10 4 9:46 10 5 1:04 10 5
3 1:88 10 2 3:26 10 3 3:87 10 3 1:97 10 3
4 9:13 10 2 2:63 10 2 5:80 10 2 2:96 10 2
5 2:32 10 1 1:02 10 1 2:47 10 1 1:77 10 1
6 3:02 10 1 2:34 10 1 3:83 10 1 3:66 10 1
7 2:34 10 1 3:03 10 1 2:45 10 1 3:12 10 1
8 9:83 10 2 2:21 10 1 5:87 10 2 1:04 10 1
9 2:05 10 2 9:11 10 2 4:60 10 3 9:62 10 3
10 1:91 10 3 1:71 10 2 1:31 10 4 1:86 10 4
11 5:00 10 5 1:12 10 3 0 0
var 1:64 10 2 1:69 10 2 1:04 10 2 1:04 10 2
Table A.6: Long-run simulation results for k = 11.
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